## Case

### 2AC—Impact Overview

#### Counterterror violence outweighs—

#### 1. We are losing now—Turse says over the past 15 years, we’ve ratcheted up counterterror operations, yet both terrorist and “state” violence have only continued to increase. The fact the neg can’t identify a “win condition” for the war on terror proves they have no strategy or solution for how to end the violence. Their logic just keeps us on the treadmill—that’s Jackson.

#### 2. Prioritize invisible violence—counterterror operations, specifically drones, traumatize communities, eviscerate families, and make certain cultural practices too dangerous to continue. Current cost-benefit analysis discounts this structural violence, ensuring that certain populations are always sacrificed in the name of pre-empting possible violence against Americans—that’s Holewinski.

#### The neg’s model of impact calculus will inevitably result in extinction via environmental destruction and war because it constantly focuses on addressing flashpoint conflicts, rather than addressing the underlying conditions that enable that violence in the first place, such as resource consumption and inequality. That’s Jabri and Szentes.

### AT: Util

#### Consequentialism is inapplicable to the war on terror. Util presupposes one can accurately assess threats, but a politics of fear permeates our institutions. We base threat levels on fantasy projections rather than on hard evidence.

#### This creates a slippery slope because the government counts as evidence of success the (non)victims of terrorist attacks that never happened. Because knowledge of the threat is always imperfect, we kill 10 to save 100, 100 for 1000, and 1000 for a million.

#### This is empirically demonstrated by the preemption logic drove us to invade Iraq, torture detainees, and kill civilians with drones, which in combination have resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Cheney’s 1% doctrine overwhelms any checks on violence that lack of knowledge should induce. You can’t trust utilitarianism in this context—that’s Jackson and Jabri.

## AT: T—Forces

### 2AC—Military Presence

#### We meet—C/x—we said w/d force

#### Counter-interpretation—assessing presence *requires* mission focus.

GAO 91 (US General Accounting Office Report August 1991, “MILITARY PRESENCE U.S. Personnel in the Pacific Theater”, http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150991.pdf)

This report describes the U.S. military presence in the Pacific theater as of March 31, 1990. Similar to our 1989 GAO report on military presence in NATO Europe,’ this report addresses the following questions that we believe will be useful to Congress in assessing the US. military presence in the Pacific theater:

* What are the missions, military command structures, and reporting channels of the service and DOD organizations located in the theater?
* How many military and civilian personnel are assigned in the Pacific theater, and how many dependents are residing with them?
* What is the cost to staff, maintain, and operate facilities in the theater and the cost of equipment assigned to the theater?

#### Key to aff ground—any other interpretation leaves only one Africa aff which loses to PICs which contrive the point of clash and makes aff debating impossible

#### We meet—plan in a vacuum says significant withdrawal of presence—they just operationally define the plan

#### Presence is a total of 2000 troops—the aff is a significant reduction

Quintana & Florance 15 - Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Allison Center & Policy Analyst for Economic Freedom in Africa and the Middle East in the Allison Center

[Ana R. Quintana and Charlotte M. Florance, Regions of Enduring Interest: Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, from 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, Heritage Foundation, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015\_Index\_of\_US\_Military\_Strength\_FINAL.pdf]

Current U.S. Military Presence in Africa

In October 2007, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established to effect better coordination of all U.S. military engagements with the countries of Africa (except Egypt, for which the U.S. Central Command has responsibility), including the continent’s island nations and surrounding waters. AFRICOM is responsible for the Pentagon’s relations with African countries; the African Union (a regional union that consists of 53 African states but excludes Morocco);13 and African regional security organizations such as the Economic Commission of West African States’ Department of Defense.14 While its headquarters is not physically located in Africa, AFRICOM is the primary instrument by which the U.S. works with Africa’s various militaries.

AFRICOM is headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart-Moerhringen, Germany. The newest geographic combatant command, AFRICOM, initially a sub-unified command under U.S. European Command, officially became a separate combatant command in October 2008. AFRICOM supports a broad range of U.S. agencies and supports the Department of State in outreach and relationship building. AFRICOM addresses a multiplicity of threats emanating from Africa—challenges that require non-traditional military solutions and encouraging long-term partnerships aimed at addressing the root causes of problems that plague the region. During the initial rollout of AFRICOM, one U.S. official claimed that the command would be a success “if it keeps U.S. troops out of Africa for the next 50 years.”15 AFRICOM currently serves as a test case for the Army’s program to develop regionally aligned brigades. Such brigades would focus on an assigned region and align their unit and personnel training accordingly to include language skills, cultural familiarity, exercise scheduling, and analysis of evolving security conditions. Missions assigned to these brigades would range from two-person teams working closely with local counterparts to accomplish sensitive tasks to more than 300 soldiers conducting airborne and humanitarian training with partner country forces. These units will have conducted more than 100 missions in 2014.16

AFRICOM is supported by six subordinate commands:

- U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), operating out of Vicenza, Italy;

- U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), headquartered in Naples, Italy, and with its staff shared with U.S. Naval Forces Europe;

- U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, with its staff shared with U.S. Air Forces in Europe;

- U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF), located in Stuttgart, Germany, with its staff shared with U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe;

- Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), headquartered at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti; and

- U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCAFRICA), co-located with AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany.

Notably, CJTF–HOA serves as one of the most critical subordinate commands, both for AFRICOM and for U.S. military operations in Africa, because it is physically present in Africa. CJTF–HOA consists of approximately 2,000 military personnel from the U.S. and allied countries at its headquarters in Djibouti. Its assigned area of interest includes all of East Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as operations in Mauritius, Comoros, Liberia, and Rwanda; its efforts are aimed at improving African countries’ capacity to sustain a stable environment, including effective governance systems that provide a degree of economic and social advancement to their citizens.17 Recent missions include the East Africa Response Force (EARF) that was deployed to Juba, South Sudan, for three months to secure the U.S. embassy after conflict broke out between government and rebel forces in December 2013.

Despite the creation of AFRICOM and the diverse set of tools and programs intended to support African-led solutions to African problems, serious challenges remain. U.S. military efforts in the region face a shortage of key capabilities, including persistent wide-area intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),18 that result in a severely limited understanding of what is happening on the ground in such areas as Northern Nigeria, deep in Central Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or on the open Indian Ocean well beyond the Seychelles.19 The relatively small number of AFRICOM forces and engagement opportunities across the extraordinary expanse of Africa means that AFRICOM has to rely on platforms instead of people to collect intelligence and develop and maintain situational awareness of evolving security conditions. Consequently, the fewer high-endurance ISR platforms there are available to AFRICOM, the less awareness it has in high-interest areas of Africa.

#### Functional limits check—terrorism DA is core aff offense—if you don’t have that ready to go you’re bad at debate

#### African presence is *mission based* –the aff ends all counter terror presence.

Ploch 11 (Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs at the Congressional Research Service in the Report submitted to congress citing the DOD, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa”)

The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Africa in support of U.S. national interests. Operational activities may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief,76 peacekeeping, counterterrorism efforts, sanctions enforcement, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs).

#### W/m significant—Turse

#### Context is important—military presence must be contextually defined based on the area.

ISAB 15 (This is a report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation, “Report on Status of Forces Agreement”, January 16, 2015)

The contexts in which SOFA issues arise have evolved. The first context led to the NATO SOFA and similarly comprehensive agreements with other allies, developed after WWII as U.S. overseas military presence transitioned from wartime combat and occupation to long term peacetime stationing of U.S. forces in fully sovereign nations with which the United States had strong alliance or other security commitments. The second context emerged after the Cold War as the U.S. military undertook extensive programs of “engagement” with nations in the Third World or recently freed from Soviet domination – countries with which the United States did not have a security commitment or formal alliance. Military interactions with these countries usually involved exercises, training, and humanitarian assistance often of limited duration. The third also emerged in the early 1990s, during post-conflict transitions, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief in difficult security situations, with widespread low-level conflict and some significant combat. After 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and extensive counterterrorist operations produced a fourth context – continuing U.S. military presence that mixed intense combat with training local forces and broader “nation building” in circumstances of often uneasy cooperation with the local government.

#### Reasonabiltiy—if we don’t make debate impossible they make t take over substance

## AT: Repurpose CP (Harvard)

### 2AC Perm—Repurpose CP

#### Perm – do the CP – we are only responsible for the plan and not the entire resolution – the fact that some military presence COULD be good does not prove that the aff’s reduction is bad—prefer this model—

#### a. Aff predictability—their interpretation requires that we defend any possible military presence, which means the negative can change that presence in any number of unpredictable ways. We should only be responsible for defending a reduction of the presence that exists NOW, not any possible military that COULD exist.

#### b. Justifies hypotesting – the logic of their argument leads to hypotesting, which causes devolution into warrants and counter-warrants instead of analysis of policy. Parametricizing the resolution is better because it allows nuanced tests of specific policies.

#### Perm – do the plan and deploy non-military forces to MEDCAP—the CP is only a test of military presence if they can prove that ONLY military presence can solve their net benefit. It should not be an aff burden to have evidence that another group could solve, it must be a negative burden to prove that military forces are NECESSARY and not just SUFFICIENT to solve their net benefit. Intrinsicness is uniquely justified because the negative has introduced a use for military presence that is not intrinsic to the aff.

#### Perm—reduce CT presence and assign counter-piracy presence to counter-illegal fishing—that doesn’t sever. It’s not in the horn, it’s in the Gulf of Aden

#### The neg ev is all about Naval assets—this doesn’t apply to drones or Marines doing targeted killings

### AT: Humanitarian Aid DA

#### AFRICOM aid fails—the military hypes these projects but empirics and internal reports tell a different story.

-Empirically, military aid projects fail—Pentagon report agrees

-The military hypes up these humanitarian projects without mentioning their true purpose or nature

-These projects are instrumentally designed to increase U.S. military access

Nick TURSE, historian, essayist, investigative journalist, the associate editor of TomDispatch.com, and currently a fellow at Harvard University's Radcliffe Institute, 14 [“Pentagon report slams humanitarian aid missions in Africa,” *Salon*, September 13, 2014, http://www.salon.com/2014/09/13/pentagon\_report\_slams\_humanitarian\_aid\_missions\_in\_africa\_partner/]

The U.S. is trying to win a war for the hearts and minds of Africa. But a Pentagon investigation suggests that those mystery projects somewhere out there in Djibouti or Ethiopia or Kenya or here in Tanzania may well be orphaned, ill-planned, and undocumented failures-in-the-making. According to the Department of Defense’s watchdog agency, U.S. military officials in Africa “did not adequately plan or execute” missions designed to win over Africans deemed vulnerable to the lures of violent extremism.

This evidence of failure in the earliest stages of the U.S. military’s hearts-and-minds campaign should have an eerie resonance for anyone who has followed its previous efforts to use humanitarian aid and infrastructure projects to sway local populations in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. In each case, the operations failed in spectacular ways, but were only fully acknowledged after years of futility and billions of dollars in waste. In Africa, a war zone about which most Americans are completely unaware, the writing is already on the wall. Or at least it should be. While Pentagon investigators identified a plethora of problems, their report has, in fact, been kept under wraps for almost a year, while the command responsible for the failures has ignored all questions about it from TomDispatch.

Doing a Bad Job at Good Works

Today, the U.S. military increasingly confronts Africa as a “battlefield” or “battleground” or “war” in the words of the men running its operations. To that end, it has built a sophisticated logistics network to service a growing number of small outposts, camps, and airfields, while carrying out, on average, more than one mission each day somewhere on the continent. A significant number of these operations take the form of a textbook hearts-and-minds campaign that harkens back to failed U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s and more recently in the Greater Middle East.

In Vietnam, the so-called civilian half of the war — building schools, handing out soap, and offering rudimentary medical care — was obliterated by American heavy firepower that wiped out homes, whole hamlets, and whatever goodwill had been gained. As a result, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was tossed into the military’s dustbin — only to be resurrected decades later, as the Iraq War raged, by then-general and later CIA director David Petraeus.

In 2005-2006, Petraeus oversaw the revision of FM 3-24, the military’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual, and a resulting revolution in military affairs. Soon, American military officers in Iraq and Afghanistan were throwing large sums of money at complex problems, once again with the objective of winning hearts and minds. They bought off Sunni insurgents and poured billions of dollars into nation-building efforts, ranging from a modern chicken processing plant to a fun-in-the-sun water park, trying to refashion the rubble of a failed state into a functioning one.

As with Petraeus’s career, which implodedamidst scandal, the efforts he fostered similarly went down in flames. In Iraq, the chicken processing plant proved a Potemkin operationand the much ballyhooed Baghdad water park quickly fell into ruin. The country soon followed. Less than three years after the U.S. withdrawal, Iraq teeters on the brink ofcatastrophe as most of Petraeus’s Sunni mercenaries stood aside while the brutalIslamic State carved a portion of its caliphate from the country, and others, aggrieved with the U.S.-backed government in Baghdad, sided with them. In Afghanistan, the results have been similarly dismal as America’s hearts-and-minds monies yielded roads to nowhere (where they haven’t already deteriorated into death traps), crumbling buildings, over-crowded, underfunded, and teacher-less schools, and billions poured down the drain in one boondoggle after another.

In Africa, the sums and scale are smaller, but the efforts are from the same counterinsurgency playbook. In fact, to the U.S. military, humanitarian assistance — from medical care to infrastructure projects — is a form of “security cooperation.” According to the latest edition of FM 3-24, publishedearlier this year:

“When these activities are used to defeat an insurgency, they are part of a counterinsurgency operation. While not all security cooperation activities are in support of counterinsurgency, security cooperation can be an effective counterinsurgency tool. These activities help the U.S. and the host nation gain credibility and help the host nation build legitimacy. These efforts can help prevent insurgencies…”

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and its subordinate command, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, have spent years engaged in such COIN-style humanitarian projects. These have been touted in news releases at their websites in lieu of candid information on the true scale and scope of AFRICOM’s operations, the exponential growth of its activities, its spy operations, and shadowy base-building efforts. Take a cursory glance at its official news releases and you’ll find them crammed with feel-good stories like an effort by CJTF-HOA personnel to tutor would-be Djiboutian hotel workers in English or a joint effort by the State Department, AFRICOM, and the Army Corps of Engineers to build six new schools in Togo. Such acts are never framed in the context of counterinsurgency nor with an explicit link to U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds. And never is there any mention of failings or fiascos.

However, an investigation by the Department of Defense’s Inspector General (IG), completed last October but never publicly released, found failures in planning, executing, tracking, and documenting such projects. The restricted report, obtained by TomDispatch, describes a flawed system plagued by a variety of deeply embedded problems.

In some cases, military officials failed to identify how their projects even supported AFRICOM’s objectives on the continent; in others, financial documentation was missing; in still others, CJTF-HOA personnel failed to ensure that local populations were equipped to keep the small-scale projects running or effective once the Americans moved on. The risk, the report suggests, is that these signs of Washington’s goodwill and good intentions will quickly fall into disrepair and become what one American official called “monuments to U.S. failure” in Africa.

AFRICOM reacted defensively. In an internal memo, Colonel Bruce Nickle, the acting Chief of Staff of U.S. Africa Command, criticized the Inspector General’s methodology, questioned the IG’s expertise, and suggested that some of the findings were “misleading.” Close to a year after the report’s release, neither AFRICOM nor CJTF-HOA has announced policy changes based on its recommendations. Repeated requests, over a period of months, by TomDispatch to AFRICOM media chief Benjamin Benson and the CJTF-HOA Public Affairs office for comment, further information, or clarification about the report as well as a request to interview Nickle have all gone unanswered.

COIN and the Fountains

Across Africa, the U.S. military is engaged in a panoply of aid projects with an eye toward winning a war of ideas in the minds of Africans and so beating back the lure of extremist ideologies — from that of Boko Haram in Nigeria to Somalia’s al Shabab. These so-called civil-military operations, or CMOs, include “humanitarian assistance” projects like the construction or repair of schools, water wells and waste treatment systems, and “humanitarian and civic assistance” (HCA) efforts, like offering dental and veterinary care.

Kindness may be its own reward, but in the case of the U.S. military, CMO benevolence is designed to influence foreign governments and civilian populations in order to “facilitate military operations and achieve U.S. objectives.” According to the Pentagon, humanitarian assistance efforts are engineered to improve “U.S. visibility, access, and influence with foreign military and civilian counterparts,” while HCA projects are designed to “promote the security and foreign policy interests of the United States.” In the bureaucratic world of the U.S. military, these small-scale efforts are further divided into “community relations activities,” like the distribution of sports equipment, and “low-cost activities” such as seminars on solar panel maintenance or English-language discussion groups. Theoretically at least, add all these projects together and you’ve taken a major step toward winning Africans away from the influence of extremists. But are these projects working at all? Has anyone even bothered to check?

In a report titled “Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Needed Better Guidance and Systems to Adequately Manage Civil-Military Operations,” the Department of Defense’s Inspector General found record keeping so abysmal that its officials “did not have an effective system to manage or report community relations and low cost activities.” A spreadsheet supposedly tracking community low cost activities during 2012 and 2013 was so incomplete that 43% of such efforts went unmentioned.

Nonetheless, the IG did manage to review 49 of 137 identified humanitarian assistance and civic assistance projects, which cost U.S. taxpayers about $9 million, and found that the military officials overseeing CMO “did not adequately plan or execute” them in accordance with AFRICOM’s “objectives.” Close to 20% of the time, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa even failed to accurately explain the possible relationship of specific projects to objectives like countering extremist organizations or expanding AFRICOM’s “network of partners on the continent.” Examining 66 community relations and low cost activities, investigators found that CJTF-HOA had failed to accurately identify their strategic objectives for, or maintained limited documentation on, 62% of them.

The task force also failed to report or could not provide information on expenditures for four of six projects selected for special review, despite a requirement to do so and the use of a computerized system specifically designed to track such information. These projects — two schools and a clinic in Djibouti as well as a school in Ethiopia — cost American taxpayers almost $1.3 million, yet U.S. officials failed to properly account for where all that money actually went. All told, officials were unable to verify whether almost $229,000 in taxpayer dollars spent on such projects were properly accounted for.

Investigators only inspected four humanitarian assistance worksites — two in Djibouti and two here in Tanzania — but even in this tiny sample found one site where the U.S. military had failed to ensure that the host nation would sustain the project. At the Ali Sabieh Community Water Fountains in Djibouti, renovated by the U.S. in 2010 to minimize waterborne disease, investigators found a scene of utter disrepair. Doors, pipes, and faucets “had been removed,” while another faucet “had a collapsed top,” leaving the water “exposed to contaminants.” Photographs taken two years after the project was completed display dilapidated, crumbling, and seemingly jerry-rigged structures.

One American official assured IG investigators of the necessity of obtaining host nation “buy-in” on such projects to achieve success, while another suggested it was crucial that local “sweat equity” be invested in such projects, if they weren’t to become “monuments to U.S. failure.” In Djibouti, however, local residents were apparently given no information about upkeep of the Ali Sabieh project. As a result, Djiboutians threw rocks into a well built by Americans, a method that works to raise water in indigenously built wells. In this case, however, it damaged the well so badly that it stopped working.

Examining a sample of projects, the Pentagon’s investigators found that 73% of the time CJTF-HOA personnel failed to collect sufficient data 30 days after completion of projects, to assess whether it achieved the stated objectives. For example, five hours north of here at a medical clinic at Manza Bay, the U.S. built cisterns and a water catchment system. The project was apparently considered a success, but the military had very little data to back up that claim. In Garissa, in neighboring Kenya, a veterinary civic action project was evidently also declared a triumph without anything to prove it beyond vague upbeat claims of success in impressing local residents.

### 2AC AT: Non-Troops CP

#### U.S. military presence in Africa is instrumental to creation of instability and conflict in the region. AFRICOM’s reliance on military force securitizes the region, prompting permanent militarization of African society. The impact is large-scale civilian suffering and insecurity.

-AFRICOMs approach relies on military force creating insecurity and undermining African civil society in the name of U.S. security interests

-This securitization of Africa links its poverty and governance problems to terrorism, creating racist backlash

-It also militarizes our relationships with African countries as well as their societies

-US presence only creates more insurgents and instability

Jeremy H. KEENAN, Department of Social Anthropology and Sociology, School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), University of London, 10 [“Africa unsecured? The role of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in securing US imperial interests in Africa,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2010, p. 27-47, Accessed Online through MSU Libraries]

Implications of the development–security discourse for the peoples of Africa

Does the US military, through it Africa Command, have any prospect of bringing peace, security and development to Africa? While AFRICOM's commanders have been preaching ‘security and development’, their operations on the ground, as seen in the examples cited above, have demonstrated Washington's primary reliance on the use of military force to pursue its strategic interests. During the period of the Bush Administration, AFRICOM's operations did little more than create insecurity and undermine democratic expressions of civil society. If the ‘reality’ of the AFRICOM policy (as distinct from the rhetoric and disinformation) is continued, it will have at least four serious consequences for the peoples of Africa.

Firstly, as Abrahamsen (2005) has emphasised, the link between underdevelopment and terrorism has served to generate a negative image of fear around the continent, and has created suspicion and hostility towards its people, with a consequent deterioration in race relations, stricter European-wide immigration controls and asylum laws, 24 and the erosion of civil liberties in the face of perceived terrorist threats. Through this discourse, ‘underdevelopment, chaos and state failure become the expression of “otherness”, rather than an outcome and reflection of certain deficiencies and shortcoming in contemporary international relations between north and south’ (Abrahamsen 2005). Above all, this new discourse explicitly links Africa's poor – her ‘dangerous classes’ – the marginalised and excluded to international ‘security problems’ and ‘terrorism’.

Secondly, it will militarise US relations with Africa and militarise numerous African countries which, in turn, will be more likely to use force in obtaining their own objectives. This development not only enhances the ‘military definition of reality’ (Lutz 2009b, p. 27), but also encourages military in preference to diplomatic intervention. Indeed, with ‘the current ratio in US funding for defence versus diplomatic/development operations abroad [at] 17 to 1, there are grave concerns about the power of the Pentagon to orient US policy in Africa toward military rather than civilian functions’ (Besteman 2009, p. 123). As Lutz (2009b) has commented, ‘Foreign aid and diplomacy now often run, not ambassador to ambassador but military to military, strengthening those armies overseas as well’ (p. 30). In fact, the situation is even worse than this in that US Ambassadors, formerly the official representatives of the President, the Commander in Chief of all US military forces, in the countries to which they are appointed, are now by-passed by the Pentagon and often kept completely in the dark about the actions and engagements of US forces in those countries. For example, the US Ambassador in Algeria in 2006 was totally unaware of the transfer of US Special Forces from Stuttgart to Tamanrasset before their incursion into Mali to support Algeria in its promotion of the 23 May 2006 Tuareg rebellion outlined above. 25 This increased militarisation of aid and development programmes in African countries further marginalises civil society, its organisation and development. As Besteman (2009) remarked, ‘Militarizing society works against democratic decision-making, civilian controlled governance and participatory citizenship’ (p. 124).

Thirdly, the presence of US bases and domestic governments' encouragement to use force in preference to more democratic means will ultimately create more militants and hence unrest and insecurity, as we are now seeing in most countries across the Sahelian zone. This is precisely the syndrome that has underpinned the increased resistance (to foreign invasion) and radicalisation of the Al Shabah in Somalia and the escalation of Tuareg rebellions in both Niger and Mali.

Lastly, the US Administration's primary reliance on its military has effectively usurped the role of the State Department and specialised agencies such as USAID whose skills and experience are better suited to achieving the ‘peace’, ‘security’ and ‘development’ that AFRICOM claims to espouse. 26 The Pentagon budget is now 30 times the combined size of the non-military components of the State Department and USAID budgets (Lutz 2009b).

Indeed, when we examine AFRICOM's interventions, we can see that they are serving largely to protect unpopular, repressive regimes supportive of US interests. In the case of North Africa and the Sahel regions, the US military intervention of the last five to six years has served to reinforce the authoritarian and repressive means of states in the region, not only through the provision of more high-technology surveillance, weapons and security systems, but also by emboldening the state security services in their abuse of power. One prominent local citizen in southern Algeria expressed the views of many when he said: ‘Now that they [the Algerian authorities] have the Americans behind them, they have become even bigger bullies’ (Keenan 2010). The US intervention is thus prolonging and perhaps even entrenching fundamentally undemocratic regimes, while weakening or delaying the development of autonomous and more democratic civil societies.

In the same vein, the ruling regimes being supported by the US in this way are in turn still using the pretext of the GWOT to repress legitimate opposition by linking it with ‘terrorism’. The ruling regimes of the North Africa–Sahara–Sahel region, as well as those in many other African countries, have provoked elements of civil society, usually minority groups of one sort or another, into civil unrest or taking up arms. Examples are the Kidal rebellion and the ransacking of Tin Zaouatene in Mali mentioned above, Algeria's Tamanrasset riots in July 2005, and Niger's Aïr uprising of winter 2004–2005 (Keenan 2010). The GWOT has provided these regimes with ‘terrorism rents’ in the form of military, financial and other largesse that stems ultimately from Washington. 27 More significantly, these local–regional outbreaks of civil unrest and rebellion (‘incursions’) by minority-cum-opposition groups have served to legitimise the US military presence in these countries. However, the instability that has resulted is doing immense damage to local livelihoods and well-being. In the Sahara–Sahel, for example, as with parts of East Africa, it has destroyed the tourism industry on which many local people depended for their livelihood.

The tragedy of the Bush Administration's Saharan–Sahel front is that it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Keenan 2010). The same is now true of Somalia, which has presented President Obama with a ‘policy nightmare’, other parts of East Africa and perhaps also the eastern DRC. Six years of fabricated terrorism and provoked unrest have transformed large, hitherto relatively tranquil tracts of Africa into zones of instability, rebellion, war and ‘terror’. Far from bringing ‘peace and security’ to Africa, the US military presence, first through EUCOM and now through AFRICOM, has been directly instrumental in creating conflict and insecurity. The way in which the US and its military have intervened in Somalia, Kenya, the DRC, Niger, and Mali are not good advertisements for the US military and the role of AFRICOM in the future of Africa's development.

## Yemen CP

#### Perm do both

#### Can’t solve the aff—

#### 1. Discursive investment—the net benefit is the TK is good to solve terrorism—they rely upon the same understanding of permanent threat that requires pre-emption, which drives the U.S. war machine. That’s Jackson

#### 2. Doesn’t get rid of all CT—Campbell says we need a new research agenda to reorient our response to terrorism away from repression. Hudson says only 7% of terrorist organiations have ended via repression, the aff’s research agenda is necessary to open space to consider, more effective responses. The CP just locks in the current strategy.

### 2AC TK Fails

#### TK doesn’t solve—

#### 1. Analysis of data sets shows decapitation doesn’t reduce levels of terrorist violence. Institutionalized groups, like al Qaeda, retain cohesion despite loss of leaders at all levels. Civilian casualties do increase levels of backlash, and support for terrorist violence—that’s Long.

#### TK can’t end terrorism—evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan proves it fails against highly institutionalized groups.

Austin LONG, assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, former adviser with Coalition forces in Iraq (2007-8) and with Coalition forces in Afghanistan (2011-2013), 14 [“Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 2014, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

For the insurgent, organization is the sine qua non for survival, much less success. In both Anbar and Kandahar, loose organizations rapidly gave way to increasingly orderly, hierarchical, even bureaucratic, organizations. The available evidence clearly supports the primary hypothesis that well-institutionalized organizations that lose leaders will not lose cohesion. Institutionalization enabled AQI and the Taliban to retain cohesion despite continuous and substantial loss of leaders at all levels to the most massive and successful leadership targeting campaigns in history.

This conclusion helps clarify Jenna Jordan's findings on organizational age and size. While probabilistically speaking, older and larger organizations are more likely to be well institutionalized, neither is a prerequisite. Both the Taliban and AQI achieved robust institutionalization very rapidly and prior to major organizational growth. Indeed, institutionalization aided organizational expansion in the case of AQI, as its resistance to leadership targeting allowed it to absorb or co-opt other organizations. This supports Johnston's finding that organizational age per se has little to do with resisting leadership targeting. It also indicates that Price's characterization of the problems of institutionalization and leadership succession in these groups does not hold in some important cases.

This conclusion explicitly repudiates the hypothesis that insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan has been fundamentally different in organization from traditional insurgency. The image of these insurgencies as very flat decentralized and networked organizations that are amorphous and fluid, with no central command, has gained the status of conventional wisdom. Yet AQI and the Taliban succeeded precisely because they were hierarchical and bureaucratic, traits that successful insurgents such as the Viet Cong would recognize. This is not to say the AQI and the Taliban have not availed themselves of modern technology and communications. Yet cellphones and computers did not substitute for formal organization, they merely enhanced it, as the radio enhanced Viet Cong organization.

Support for the secondary hypothesis, that the loss of mid-level leaders will not degrade the capability of well-institutionalized leaders, is strong but less compelling than that supporting the primary hypothesis. AQI continued to gain capability even as it lost mid-level leaders on a large scale through 2007, which supports the hypothesis. The subsequent decline in AQI capability is attributed to a variety of factors beyond leadership targeting so it is difficult to judge the effect of leadership targeting after 2007. The Taliban in Kandahar has likewise not suffered a substantial decline in capability despite losing many mid-level leaders.

The evidence presented also demonstrates the importance of institutionalization for anti-insurgent forces. All of the poorly institutionalized anti-insurgent organizations examined in both Iraq and Afghanistan proved susceptible to leadership targeting. Only extensive efforts to protect the leadership of these organizations combined with at least initiating institutionalization has enabled any of them to survive the insurgents’ leadership targeting. The Iraqi and Afghan police, despite highly varied capability, have nonetheless remained cohesive (though not always capable) despite the loss of leaders at all levels.

The importance of organizational characteristics such as functional specialization, bureaucracy, standard operating procedure, and hierarchy should come as no surprise to military officers or social scientists. Military organizations and industrial manufacturers both have these characteristics for a reason—they allow for the efficient production of goods, be it military force or microchips. This is no different for insurgent organizations, though the fact that they are clandestine organizations adds additional difficulties and can also conceal the degree to which they are organized.

Note that hierarchy and chain of command does not equate to total lack of autonomy for subordinates. Indeed, many effective military organizations give substantial autonomy to subordinates through what are termed “mission type” orders. This does not indicate lack of central guidance or strategy; rather it enables strategy by giving flexibility in tactical decisions to those best able to make those decisions: the commanders in the field.

The foregoing discussion does not fully answer the question of endogeneity of institutionalization. The available evidence rules out some variables as endogenous sources of institutionalization such as preexisting social networks or religious motivation. Yet the question of why AQI and the Taliban were able to effectively institutionalize so rapidly remains unclear and should be explored in future work.

For policymakers, the evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan offers some lessons. First, the foregoing does not mean that leadership targeting has no effect on well-institutionalized organizations. It is still disruptive at a minimum as even the effective replacement of leaders is not instantaneous. Moreover, leaders are not totally interchangeable; some are simply better than others. Furthermore, leadership targeting also exerts a suppressive effect on leaders, as they must undertake extensive security measures to avoid being targeted. Alex Wilner's research highlights other potential effects of leadership targeting on insurgent/terrorist activity, such as causing insurgents to shift from difficult “hardened” targets to easier “soft” targets.143

Yet these are tactical and operational rather than strategic effects. In terms of President Barack Obama's declared goal of “disrupting, dismantling, and defeating” al Qaeda, leadership targeting, whether carried out by special operations forces in Afghanistan or drones in Pakistan, can create disruption and temporary dismantling but it cannot defeat the organization, contrary to Secretary Panetta's assertion. Likewise in Iraq, leadership targeting does not appear to have been “a major, even indispensable, catalyst for success” as some advocates claim.144

This in turn suggests that expectations and resource allocation should be managed with an eye to the institutionalization of both hostile and allied organizations. If confronted by poorly institutionalized insurgent organizations, leadership targeting can have a substantial effect and should be resourced accordingly. However, dedicating massive resources to leadership targeting of well-institutionalized groups, while under-resourcing efforts to protect and institutionalize useful anti-insurgent organizations, appears suboptimal.

Additionally, while US leadership targeting is not indiscriminate, there are still mistakes. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, individuals have been targeted incorrectly while even accurate targeting can produce collateral damage. These mistakes often produce backlash among the relevant population and/or its political leadership.145 While this is not a reason to completely abandon leadership targeting, policymakers should evaluate whether the likely gains from targeting an organization's leaders will be sufficiently effective to outweigh these costs.

#### 2. Diplomacy solves better—a RAND study that analyzed 268 terrorist groups showed only 7 percent were eliminated by military repression. Compromise was vastly more successful. The counterterror epistemological crisis denies the possibility of alternate solutions—the aff’s research agenda is necessary to create the rhetorical space necessary for contemplating alternative approaches—that’s Hudson and Jackson.

#### Turn—drones metastasize terrorist violence. Every empiric is on our side.

Audrey Kurth CRONIN, Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, former Specialist in Terrorism at the Congressional Research Service, 15 [“The Strategic Implications of Targeted Drone Strikes for US Global Counterterrorism” in *Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Implications*, ed. by David Cortright, Rachel Fairhurst, and Kristen Wall, 2015, p. 113]

No one seems to be undertaking the (admittedly difficult) task of calculating the overall costs and benefits for long-term US policy. Really stopping a major attack along the lines of 9/11 might be worth the international opprobrium against the US drone campaign. But what if all we are doing is driving down international support and alienating local governments, rather than effectively halting what is almost impossible to stop-namely, a small cell of determined jihadists trying to execute a minor attack on US soil?

Finally, it is worth considering whether the drone attacks are contributing to the metastasizing of the al-Qaeda threat. In one of his last letters, Osama bin Laden urged the brothers to move from North Waziristan to escape the drones. There is an alphabet soup now of groups with long- standing local struggles, mostly local membership, and now some connection to core al-Qaeda (or its agenda), including ISIS, AQAP, AQIM, AQI, Al Shabab, and Boko Haram. This is not historically surprising. The fractionation of terrorist groups is a well-known by-product of campaigns of decapitation and repression. The aggressive Russian campaign of assassinations of Chechen leaders between 2002 and 2006, for example, resulted in a shift from a bloody separatist insurgency to an increasingly radicalized movement that spread to the broader Caucasus.35 The Russians killed virtually every major Chechen leader and pummeled Grozny to rubble; but although Chechnya came firmly under Russian control, violence spread to Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. Today those who argue that we should stay the course tend to be the same people who warn that the al-Qaeda threat is spreading throughout the Middle East and Africa. It is worth pondering whether US use of armed drones is contributing to this dynamic.

The drones are killing operatives who aspire to attack the United States today or tomorrow. But they are probably also increasing the likelihood of attacks over the longer term, building resentment and a desire for vengeance. In short, whether or not drones are helping us conserve our enemies and deflect Islamist violence away from Americans is a mixed picture.

#### UQ makes no sense—if risk of nuclear theft high now—disproves that CT is working

#### Impact ev = 09—empirically denies

### 2AC AT: Nuke Terrorism

#### Fear of nuke terror is crap and distracts from larger problems—only the terror is real

Leonard WEISS, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, former professor of applied mathematics and engineering at Brown University and the University of Maryland, 15 [“On fear and nuclear terrorism,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 2015, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 75-87]

Human history displays many examples of political leaders who manipulate public fears to gain support for policies that, in the end, produce disastrous outcomes for large numbers of people. Racist fears helped Nazis obtain support for the oppression and ultimate murder of millions of Jews, Slavs, homosexuals, and Roma. Eliminating Nazi predations required a war that cost 50 million lives. Excessive fear of communism built support for a war in Vietnam that resulted in two million lives lost in that country and another two million lost on the killing fields of a destabilized Cambodia. Today, the fear of terrorism brought on by 9/11, coupled with the fear of nuclear weapons, has become the source of policies that threaten the destruction of American democracy because of a lack of perspective in the public discussion of these issues.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki have shown the world the damage that nuclear weapons can do,1 but two facts are important to keep in mind during discussion of policy issues motivated by the fear of nuclear war or nuclear terrorism: Since the end of World War II, no one has died from a nuclear attack, by a state or by a sub-national group, and from the end of WWII to the year 2000, approximately 40 million people died in conventional armed conflict (Leitenberg, 2006).

Even so, stories about possible nuclear conflict or accidents are likely to be given as much or more media visibility as real, conventional conflicts. For example, examination of news media and congressional hearings over the period 1990–2009 shows a significant increase in attention to nuclear terrorism (SHIELD Project, undated), while the war in Congo, which is estimated by the International Rescue Committee to have resulted in the deaths of more than five million people since 1998 (Coghlan et al., 2007), has been virtually invisible to most media outlets.

This situation, the result of the heightened fear of nuclear weapons engendered by the possibility of nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, has been magnified by the spread of the Bomb to seven countries besides the United States and Russia. It has been boosted further by the rise of international terrorism and the frequently cited prospect that terrorists might steal or otherwise obtain nuclear explosive devices (Allison, 2004; Ferguson and Potter, 2005). In a televised debate during the US presidential election of 2004, the challenger, John Kerry, stated that nuclear terrorism was the “the single greatest threat we face in the world today” (Kerry, 2004), and the incumbent candidate, George W. Bush, replied, “I agree with my opponent that the biggest threat facing the country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network” (Allison, 2005). During that same campaign, then-Vice President Dick Cheney, also running for re-election, said:

The biggest threat we face now as a nation is the possibility of terrorists ending up in the middle of one of our cities with deadlier weapons than have ever been used against us … a nuclear weapon … able to threaten the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans. (White House, 2004)

These statements by Bush, Cheney, and Kerry were in keeping with the ostensible, but ultimately discredited, reason for the war with Iraq in 2003 that they all supported. This threat mantra has been picked up by President Obama, who called nuclear terrorism “the single biggest threat to US security” (Jackson, 2010), a phrase that returns hundreds of thousands of links when it is entered in the Google Internet search engine.

While fear of nuclear weapons is rational, its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data. Some writers have recognized this lack of data on the subject,2 and their works have started a lively debate, with pushback by proponents of the more conventional alarmist view (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). This debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real.

Despite the development and deployment of command-and-control systems in all nations with nuclear weapons (some more sophisticated than others), the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a “close call” regarding nuclear war, and that the possibility of a war being launched under conditions of confrontation cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, most analysts believe that reducing the motivation of non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the motivation of weapon states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a worthwhile ongoing goal. Achieving this goal has been helped by a number of cases in which countries have halted nuclear weapon programs or activities, or dismantled weapons in their possession.3 In these cases, the calculus dictated that security would be enhanced by giving up nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of becoming a target of another country’s nukes or motivating a rival to acquire such weapons.

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping.

Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their “trade.” If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

Nuclear terrorism … turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26)

#### Attack has to occur in russia to cause the misperception—no reason a group from Africa would do that

#### Multiple conditional worlds are a voting issue:

First—strat skew—the neg can go for what we undercover, making it impossible for us to stick them with offense. They can use our offense against us.

Second—shallow education—they don’t have to defend their advocacies, dis-incentivizing in depth research. Makes rigorous policy examination impossible and encourages contradictions—makes then bad advocates.

Third—if they win condo is good we should be allowed to advocate one legitimate permutation—it’s reciprocal.

Counter-interpretation—the neg can run one conditional option.

### Won’t Use

#### No one would use a nuke, even if they got one

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Are terrorists even interested in making their own nuclear weapons?

A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist groups in or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant.

There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyo group. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens of thousands spread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientific expertise in many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained access to natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing close surveillance.

What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to enable them to operate in a quasi-governmental fashion, like the Islamic State (IS)? Such organizations are certainly dangerous, but how would nuclear terrorism fit in with a program for building and sustaining a new caliphate that would restore past glories of Islamic society, especially since, like any organized government, the Islamic State would itself be vulnerable to nuclear attack? Building a new Islamic state out of radioactive ashes is an unlikely ambition for such groups. However, now that it has become notorious, apocalyptic pronouncements in Western media may begin at any time, warning of the possible acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by IS.

Even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects. And, of course, 9/11 has heightened sensitivity to the need for protection, lowering further the probability of a successful effort.

### AT: Al-Shabaab

#### Traditional CT approaches to al Shabaab fail—recent attacks prove resiliency.

Hussein SOLOMON, Senior Professor in the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa, and a Senior Research Associate of the Israeli-based Research for the Study of Islam and Muslims in Africa (RIMA), 15 [*Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*, 2015, p. 58-60]

(SFG = Somali Federal Government)

Traditional counter-terrorism measures have proven to be counter-productive when responding to the challenge posed by Al Shabaab. This is hardly surprising given the ahistorical nature that seems oblivious of precedents to Al Shabaab like Sayyid Hassan's jihad in the early twentieth century - precedents, incidentally, which Al Shabaab is deliberately emulating. Traditional counter-terrorism strategies seem oblivious to the central importance of clan to Somali society. If it really understood the importance of clan dynamics and the concomitant aversion to centralised rule, the international community will not be putting so much emphasis on bolstering the SFG in Mogadishu. As per the critique of CTS, too much emphasis is being put on building the Somali state - which historically never existed and which Somalis do not want. More importantly, the SFG continues to act in a partisan manner-as explained earlier, serving the clan interests of the president as opposed to the Somali 'nation'. Under the circumstances, power is shifting from Mogadishu to the plethora of 'regional authorities' mushrooming across the country. [END PAGE 58] Under the circumstances, the continued support for Mogadishu on the part of the international community is indeed puzzling.

More important is the emphasis on responding to Al Shabaab primarily by military means. Such an approach is simply not working. Jonathan Stevenson204 bluntly notes, 'A narrow counter-terrorism approach to ending this insecurity, consisting of military containment plus covert support to pro-Western Somali groups and regional powers has not worked'. A brief discussion of AMISOM reinforces this point well.

AMISOM was created in January 2007 with 3,500 troops 205 to put an end to Al Shabaab's activities, and by 2012 consisted of just over 17,000 troops.206 In October 2011, Kenya launched a military offensive into Somalia with the aim of eliminating Al Shabaab's presence along the Kenyan border. In this the Kenyan military were greatly assisted by the US. American drones, from bases in Ethiopia, supported Kenyan forces by launching several aerial attacks against Al Shabaab targets in the run-up to the Kenyan ground offensive.207 Indeed, 2011 was a busy year for the US Pentagon in the Horn of Africa. It also approved US$45 million in arms shipment to AMISOM forces.208 Following the Kenyan intervention, the 5,000 Kenyan troops were 're-hatted' and absorbed into AMISOM. This resulted in a steep increase in operational costs and AMISOM currently costs US$500 million per annum.209 The US is paying for much of this while also supporting the fight in other ways. The US CIA, for instance, runs a counter-terrorism training camp in Mogadishu itself, training Somali intelligence services.210

Even from a limited military perspective, the current beefed-up AMISOM makes no sense in terms of numbers. Between 1992 and 1993, the United Nations Operation Restore Hope in Somalia numbered 30,000 US and other troops. It was also infinitely better resourced than the current AMISOM forces. Despite this, it was a dismal failure, unable to halt the spiralling violence following the ousting of Siad Barre.211Reflecting on this, Harper 212 sadly notes, 'The US/UN military intervention of the 1990s was probably the most dramatic example of "getting Somalia wrong". It represented the archetypal wrong-headed exercise in building a state with foreign soldiers and good intentions, the more recent examples of Iraq and Afghanistan suggests lessons from this fiasco still have not been learned.' So if 30,000 US and other troops with a budget three times the one allocated for AMISOM213 could not quell the violence following Siad Barre's ousting, how could 17,000 under-resourced AMISOM forces be able to crush Al Shabaab?

The SFG's security services, meanwhile, consist of 12,000 SNA members 214 and 5,000 police officers.215 To put matters into perspective – at [END PAGE 59] the height of his power Siad Barre's security services were in excess of 100,000 members. Of course, numbers alone do not quell insurgencies; it is also the quality of the troops and the overarching strategic framework in which they are deployed.

Despite the increased foreign military presence in Somalia and steps to beef up the SFG's security capabilities, Al Shabaab struck the hapless residents of Mogadishu in 2014 with a bang: literally. It began on New Year's Day with the twin bombing of the Jazeera Hotel, which killed ten people and injured scores more.216 If that did not rattle the nerves of Somalia's fledgling government and its international supporters, the brazen attack on Somalia's presidential palace in February, which aimed to kill or capture the president should have.217 The month of February ended with another attack - this one near the national security headquarters of the SFG - in which an Al Shabaab suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a tea shop frequented by the security personnel next door. Eleven members of Somalia's security services were slain in this incident and 15 more were injured.218

Al Shabaab had also taken the fight further afield starting with the twin attacks on the Ugandan capital, Kampala, on 11 July 2010.219 The repeated attacks on the Kenyan capital as seen in the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in 2013 and twin bombings in a Nairobi market in May 2014 also illustrate the point that Al Shabaab is regionalising as it merges with Al Qaeda in East Africa.

Yet how could Al Shabaab seemingly strike at will in the supposedly heavily fortified Somali capital - not to mention attacks in regional capitals? After all, they were ejected from Mogadishu in August 2011 and in September 2012 were ejected from the port city of Kismayo, losing a lot of revenue in the process.220 Moreover AMISOM had its deployment extended to 31 October 2014 and a further 4,000 troops were added to its forces.221 A renewed AMISOM offensive, air strikes conducted by the Kenyan Air Forces and drone strikes by the US were all supposed to be taking their toll on Al Shabaab. In addition, leadership disputes within the organisation and defections from it are all supposed to have taken their toll on Somalia's Islamists.

Yet, like a multiheaded hydra, it keeps returning to do battle with government forces, AMISOM and neighbouring states such as Kenya.222 What accounts for Al Shabaab's resilience in the face of superior odds? Five major changes account for this.

#### Al-Shabaab is winning- US support is insufficient

**Odowa and Tarvainen, 9/28**/15 (Mohamed Odowa and Sinikka Tarvainen are journalists for DPA, “Doubts grow about AU mission to Somalia as al-Shabaab mounts attacks”, http://www.dpa-international.com/news/international/doubts-grow-about-au-mission-to-somalia-as-al-shabaab-mounts-attacks-a-46781777.html)

Mogadishu (dpa) - Doubts are growing about African Union forces' abilities to defeat the radical group al-Shabaab in Somalia. Despite the union's battlefield successes, the Islamists have retained their military capacity and recently carried out large-scale attacks on union bases.

Analysts said the union's troops lack sufficient intelligence gathering and organization with some of the contingents reporting to their national armies instead of the African Union command.

The joint forces of the African Union and the Somali army also have no air power to provide cover for troops and to destroy al-Shabaab bases. "We need to fight the militants from the air," Somali commander Abdirahman Mohamed Osman Tima'adde said.

Another problems is the poor perception by the public. "People do not trust our peacekeepers because they know al-Shabaab will come back if we leave them behind," a senior official with the African Union forces said from the central region of Hiiraan on the condition of anonymity.

The mission blames its problems partly on its partner, the 8,000-member Somali army, which the country has struggled to reconstitute after the government collapsed in 1991, plunging Somalia into two decades of chaos that provided fertile ground for groups like al-Shabaab to arise.

"Poorly paid and ill-disciplined Somali soldiers are part of the problem," the union official from Hiiraan said.

The confidence of Somalis in the African Union force has been eroded by incidents in which its troops reportedly fired on and killed civilians. The union's mission has denied or pledged to investigate such cases.

But businessman Yahye Abdullahi charged, "The African troops are not here in the interest of the Somali people."

The mission, in Somalia since 2007, comprises about 22,000 troops, mainly from Burundi, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia.

Analysts said the union's largest multinational force has played a key role in weakening al-Shabaab, which has an estimated 5,000 fighters.

Al-Shabaab controlled most of southern and central Somalia and parts of Mogadishu in 2009 and 2010, but Somali and African Union troops drove it out of the capital and other key cities the following year.

In 2014, al-Shabaab, which means "youth" in Arabic, lost coastal towns which had allowed it to earn port revenue, and the newest offensive, launched in July, dislodged it from its strongholds of Baardheere and Dinsoor.

Successes have been achieved with the help of the United States, which has trained elite Somali commandos and African Union troops and sends drones to target al-Shabaab, whose leader Ahmed Godane was killed in such a strike last year.

But while al-Shabaab has lost most of the towns it had controlled, it still rules over much of the countryside in southern and central Somalia, ambushing military convoys and cutting supply routes.

In June, al-Shabaab carried out a suicide car bombing and a wider assault on an African Union base in Lego in the south. In September, hundreds of Islamists stormed another base in Janaale in the same region.

More than 90 Burundian and Ugandan soldiers were killed in both attacks, said a Somali intelligence officer who asked to be identified only as Hassan.

Such incidents "do not promise a good future for the [African Union] mission," he said.

The union's soldiers responded to the attacks by withdrawing from several locations in the area, ceding them to al-Shabaab. dpa was unable to obtain an official comment from the African Union mission, whose spokesman did not respond to e-mails and phone calls.

Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab is also carrying out attacks in neighbouring countries. It killed 76 people watching football's World Cup in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, in 2010; at least 67 people at a Nairobi shopping mall in 2013; and at least 148 people at a university campus in eastern Kenya in April.

It is not known how many African Union soldiers have been killed in Somalia, with some estimates putting their number in the thousands. The recent casualties have contributed to criticism of the mission, also known as AMISOM.

"Uganda and AMISOM ... need to lay down stronger strategies" against al-Shabaab, said Norbert Mao from Uganda's opposition Democratic Party.

Yilkal Getnet from Ethiopia's opposition Blue Party said he wants a pullback in Ethiopia's contribution. "It would be better if ... Ethiopia only supported Somalia via training and logistics," he said.

In Kenya, 49 per cent of people interviewed by the polling firm Ipsos said they did not believe the African Union mission would pacify Somalia.

"We are rethinking to come up with new military structures," the mission official who requested anonymity admitted.

#### TK fails against Al-Shabaab

**Gilsinan, 14** (Kathy, senior associate editor at The Atlantic, “To Kill a Terrorist”, 9/7/14, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/to-kill-a-terrorist-shabab-somalia-godane/379723/)

On Friday, the Pentagon confirmed that American airstrikes in Somalia last week had succeeded in killing Ahmed Abdi Godane, the leader and co-founder of the al Qaeda-linked Islamist group al-Shabab. “Removing Godane from the battlefield is a major symbolic and operational loss to al-Shabaab,” Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby said in a statement.

The symbolic loss may be bigger than the operational loss, however. Targeted airstrikes or special-operations raids aimed at “taking out” leaders of terrorist organizations are arguably the most critical component of the Obama administration’s light-footprint counterterrorism strategy, which my colleague Stephanie Gaskell summed up at Defense One as: “partner up with local nations, build strong intelligence for targeted strikes and keep no U.S. boots on the ground.” But the popularity of "decapitating" militant organizations rests on an assumption: that removing an extremist group’s leadership degrades or diminishes the group as a whole—making it less violent or causing it to collapse altogether. Whether this assumption is correct is by no means a settled question, and the history of terrorist and other violent groups whose leaders have been killed or captured leaves reason for doubt.

There have been high-profile cases in which the death or capture of a militant group's leader has significantly weakened the organization. The Kurdistan Workers' Party, for example, scaled back its attacks in Turkey following the 1999 apprehension of its leader Abdullah Ocalan; analysts have also credited "leadership decapitation" with dealing decisive blows to Japan's Aum Shinrikyo and Peru's Shining Path. On the other hand, Israel has targeted Hamas leaders for years, and the Palestinian group appears nowhere near dissolving. Bloody succession struggles within Mexican drug cartels following the removal of kingpins demonstrate that the approach can actually increase a group's violence.

More systematic studies of leadership decapitation only confirm that the evidence for its success rate is mixed. In 2009, for instance, Jenna Jordon of Georgia Tech examined 298 instances of terrorist leaders being targeted between 1945 and 2004. According to her findings, organizations that experienced a loss of leadership in many cases remained active—as measured by their inclusion on the U.S. State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations—longer than organizations that collapsed for other reasons. "Organizations that have not had their leaders removed are more likely to fall apart than those that have undergone a loss of leadership," she concluded.

But different measures yield different conclusions. Examining 90 insurgent campaigns from 1975 to 2003, RAND Corporation's Patrick Johnston found evidence in 2012 that removing an insurgent group's leadership increased a government's chances of victory in counterinsurgency campaigns and decreased the violence of the conflict. A forthcoming paper from Northeastern University's Max Abrahms and the University of Michigan's Philip Potter reports that leadership decapitation may increase civilian casualties. Militant groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Abrahms and Potter discovered, became “significantly less discriminate in their targeting choices”—in other words, more likely to target civilians—after high-level militants were killed in drone strikes.

“The leadership can actually have a restraining effect on lower-level members,” Abrahms tells me. For example, al-Qaeda’s current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has instructed his rank-and-file to "avoid collateral damage," and famously split with ISIS in February in part over the group's ruthlessness. Abrahms speculates that in that sense, decapitation could indirectly and over time shorten the lifespan of a terrorist group, since such organizations usually lose popular support when they inflict high civilian casualties. But that means counterterrorism officials are making a grim calculation: Taking out terrorist leaders may benefit civilians in the long term, but in the short term it only endangers them further.

The efficacy of removing terrorist leaders depends in part on the nature of the group targeted. In her 2008 book How Terrorism Ends, Audrey Kurth Cronin of George Mason University identified leadership decapitation as one of several factors that have historically been involved, sometimes in combination, in the demise of terrorist organizations—with negotiations, loss of popular support, and repression among the others. “Those that have ended through decapitation," she has written, "have tended to be hierarchically structured, young, characterized by a cult of personality, and lacking a viable successor.” In her own study, Jordan found that religious organizations "are highly resistant to leadership decapitation."

So what kind of an organization is the suddenly leaderless al-Shabab? Kenneth Menkhaus, a political-science professor at Davidson College who has studied the group, tells me that Godane was clearly the “driver of al-Shabab strategy and policy,” mainly because of a bloody purge Godane conducted against potential rivals in the summer of 2013. But it’s also possible that the group has become more decentralized since an African Union-led offensive beginning in 2011 drove al-Shabab out of major cities in Somalia. If far-flung cadres in the countryside have been operating autonomously, Godane’s death may not change the organization much at the local level.

In fact, as Menkhaus notes, “Shabab has already experienced decapitation” and managed to recover. After a U.S. airstrike killed the group’s then-leader Aden Hashi Ayro in 2008, “Godane stepped in and it was business as usual.” Indeed, it was after Ayro’s death, and while Godane was consolidating his position, that al-Shabab carried out its highest-profile attack outside Somalia: the assault on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which killed almost 70 people. Al-Shabab has already named Godane's successor, and the Somali government has cited intelligence that the group could be planning attacks on educational and medical institutions.

For all these reasons, Cronin tells me, al-Shabab does not fit her model of a group likely to die by decapitation. “I don't see a 'cult of personality'—more like a decentralized, fractious jumble of competing individuals, clan loyalties, locals vs. foreigners, executions and murderous in-fighting,” she writes in an email.

Al-Shabab’s longevity could also depend on an amnesty that the Somali government offered to fighters in the wake of last week's airstrike, Menkhaus says. The amnesty could take advantage of any internal fissures that have opened up over the group’s future direction in the wake of Godane's death. Widespread defections could be yet another blow to al-Shabab.

If al-Shabab leaders accept the amnesty and try to take part in a power-sharing government, Menkhaus says, the U.S. will have to consider which former terrorists it is willing to deal with as part of its cooperation with the Somali government. "Who could we live with? And where do we say, 'no way?'" he asks.

These kinds of questions will only grow more urgent; the U.S. now appears to be targeting ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and has killed members of his inner circle in Iraq. Targeting top terrorists may be a fast, no-boots-on-the-ground way to avenge the deaths of innocents. But it won't necessarily make ISIS—or any extremist group, for that matter—go away.

### L/T—Bruton

#### It’s reverse causal- removing presence will defeat al-Shabaab

Bruton, 10 (Bronwyn, a democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa, was a 2008-2009 international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations, “In Somalia, Talk to the Enemy”, 7/24/10, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/opinion/25bruton.html?\_r=0)

IN 2006, the Bush administration declared Somalia the latest front in the war on terrorism: a newly influential movement, the Union of Islamic Courts, was suspected of playing host to Al Qaeda there. When this union took over the capital in June 2006, the United States tried to coax moderates within it to enter a dialogue with Somalia’s official government, a toothless institution that was exiled from the capital. But by December of that year, when the Islamic courts seemed about to take down the government entirely, neighboring Ethiopia convinced United States officials that allowing the courts to control Somalia would be tantamount to handing the country to Al Qaeda.

And so, the Ethiopian military moved into Somalia to protect the unpopular government, and for the next two years the United States bankrolled a brutal occupation. Today, no one doubts that this was a tragic error. To defend the dysfunctional government, Ethiopian soldiers robbed, killed and raped with abandon. The perception that the United States had sided with Ethiopia and the African Union internationalized the conflict. Ultimately it allowed Al Qaeda to gain a foothold in a country that American intelligence, in 2007, had declared to be “inoculated” against all kinds of foreign extremist movements.

Sadly, today, the Obama administration is poised to repeat its predecessor’s mistake.

The situation now is very similar to what it was in 2006. The Ethiopian soldiers are gone, but the regime they protected, the so-called Transitional Federal Government, is still in place, now protected by 6,000 African Union peacekeeping troops. Like the Ethiopians before them, African Union soldiers from Uganda and Burundi are inflicting thousands of civilian casualties, indiscriminately shelling neighborhoods in Mogadishu. Today most of southern Somalia is under the control of a vicious mob of teenage radicals known as Al Shabab, who are clearly getting guidance from Al Qaeda and who have proudly claimed responsibility for the attack earlier this month that killed 76 people in Uganda.

Nobody, from the White House to the African Union, can believe that the ineffectual transitional government has any hope of governing Somalia. During the latest round of infighting the speaker of Parliament was ousted and the prime minister was fired (though he has refused to step down), and soon afterward the minister of defense resigned, accusing the government not only of incompetence but also of trying to assassinate him.

Yet in the past 18 months, the international community has trained some 10,000 Somali soldiers to support this government, and American taxpayers have armed them. Seven or eight thousand of these troops have already deserted, taking their new guns with them. Indeed, Somalia’s Western-backed army is a significant source of Al Shabab’s weapons and ammunition, according to the United Nations Monitoring Group.

There are better ways for the United States to prevent the rise of terrorist groups in Somalia. A strategy of “constructive disengagement” — in which the international community would extricate itself from Somali politics, but continue to provide development and humanitarian aid and conduct the occasional special forces raid against the terrorists — would probably be enough to pull the rug out from under Al Shabab. This group, led mostly by foreign extremists fresh from the battlefields of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, is internally divided, and is hated in Somalia.

It has recruited thousands of Somali children into its militias and uses them to brutally impose a foreign ideology on the religiously moderate Somali people. The “child judges,” as they are known, are responsible for many of Al Shabab’s worst human rights violations, including stoning and amputation.

The only way Al Shabab can flourish, or even survive in the long term, is to hold itself up as an alternative to the transitional government and the peacekeepers. If the Somali public did not have to face this grim choice, the thousands of clan and business militiamen would eventually put up a fight against Al Shabab’s repressive religious edicts and taxes. (Somalia’s sheer ungovernability is both its curse and its blessing.) And without a battle against peacekeepers to unite it, Al Shabab would likely splinter into nationalist and transnational factions.

Why has the Obama administration allowed this violent farce to continue? In a nutshell, it has fallen into the same trap as the Bush administration: Distracted by the unwarranted concern that withdrawing the soldiers would allow Al Qaeda to take control of Somalia, the administration argues that it can’t afford to step back.

On the contrary, it can’t afford to do anything else. To truly stabilize Somalia by force would require 100,000 troops. Putting another few thousand on the ground — as the African Union has announced it will do — would only increase the violence. It could also necessitate sending soldiers from Ethiopia or other bordering states, bolstering Al Shabab’s best argument for popular support.

Because plans to send more soldiers to Somalia cannot succeed without American support, the Obama administration is at a significant crossroads. It is essential that it resist the temptation to allow history to repeat itself.

Instead, the United States should negotiate with the moderate elements within Al Shabab. It is not a monolithic movement, after all. Extremists from Kenya, Afghanistan, Somaliland and elsewhere have spoken publicly for the group. But Al Shabab also includes many of the same Somali religious leaders who controlled the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006, the people the Bush administration once hoped to draw into the transitional government. Some of these leaders are extremists, and the idea of talking with them is unappetizing. But the United States can and should negotiate with them directly.

Such an effort would be supported by most Somalis, who are desperate to be rid of the foreign extremists. And it is the best alternative to escalating the violence and strengthening Al Shabab.

### AT: Attack Russia

#### Terrorists wouldn’t use nuclear weapons against Russia—fear of retaliation

Frost 5—Robin, Professor of Political Science @ Simon Fraser University, British Colombia [Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11, Adelphi Papers]

In both the Palestinian and Chechen cases, would-be WMD terrorists would have to consider the threat of massive retaliation. Not only is Israel an unambiguous—albeit undeclared—nuclear-weapon state, it typically exacts disproportionate vengeance on Palestinians in response to even moderate attacks, which might deter any sane Palestinian. In the Chechen case, Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to use disproportionate force in dealing with domestic security threats. A nuclear attack by Chechen nationalists would provide a pretext for responding in kind and solving the Chechen problem once and for all. Even for Chechen nationalists, while there are some factors that increase the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, a sober calculation of the risks and benefits involved should show what an exceptionally dangerous move this would be.

#### No impact to nuclear detonation on Russian soil

Thompson 10—Nicholas Thompson is a senior editor at The New Yorker, senior fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, member of the Council on Foreign Relations [January 2, 2010, “Could Al Qaeda set off Russia’s Dead Hand nuclear system?” http://thehawkandthedove.nickthompson.com/index.php/2010/01/could-al-qaeda-set-off-russias-dead-hand-nuclear-system/]

Yesterday I got a good question from a reader: “what happens when someone like Al Qaeda detonates a bomb on Russian soil in an attempt to have a response triggered against the US?” The answer is: Likely nothing. Assuming the system works the same way as when it was constructed, there are three safeguards that would prevent this launch. The first is that the system lies idle most of the time. It has to be turned on specifically, during a crisis, when Russia is worried that the US is considering a strike. Secondly, if the system can communicate with the humans in command of the arsenal, it turns off. And, lastly, humans have to push the final button to launch. So, to succeed in starting a nuclear conflagration, Al Qaeda would have to strike when U.S. and Russian tensions were at an extraordinary level; it would have to blow up the main command and control centers in Moscow; and, somehow, the men manning the system in a bunker would have to be convinced that the strike came from the U.S. All of that happening is extremely unlikely.

### AT: Nuclear Winter

#### Nuclear winter would require many nuclear explosions.

Martin ‘88 (Brian, Associate Professor in Science, Technology, and Society at the University of Wollongong. Published in Science and Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 1988, pp. 321-334. “Nuclear winter: science and politics”)

The TTAPS paper uses a baseline case of 5000 megatonnes (MT), supplemented by a wide range of other scenarios which also lead to nuclear winter effects. Though in general terms some of the scenarios appear reasonable, no detailed strategic rationale is offeredfor any of them[22]. A cynic might say that the key characteristic of the scenarios is that they produce sufficient smoke or dust to produce nuclear winter. This is illustrated by the 100MT scenario, which is often misinterpreted as 100 bombs on 100 cities. Actually it **involves 1000 bombs** and the **burning of a vast number** of cities each of just the right size. It is easy to misinterpret the results for this scenario as showing that any 100MT war is enough to trigger nuclear winter, whereas any militarily realistic targeting of 100MT would cause **relatively few cities** to burn and probably produce **little cooling** according to present models.

## AT: China DA

### 2AC DA = Stupid

#### The U.S. can’t beat China in Africa—5 reasons. It’s also not zero-sum.

Zachary KECK, Managing Editor of *The Diplomat*, 14 [“Five Reasons Why the United States Can’t Beat China in Africa,” *The National Interest*, August 17, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-reasons-why-the-united-states-can%E2%80%99t-beat-china-africa-11094]

The administration’s efforts to reengage Africa are well founded, especially with the growing opportunities in parts of the region such as Sub-Saharan Africa. Still, there are at least five reasons why the United States can’t beat China in Africa.

Too Far Behind

The first reason why the United States can’t beat China in Africa is because it is starting from too far behind. Although China only surpassed the United States in trade with Africa in 2009, it has quickly established a sizeable lead. Last year, America’s trade with Africa stood at just $85 billion. By contrast, China’s trade with the region stood at $200 billion. Similarly, while less than 1 percent of America’s foreign direct investment went to Africa last year, at least 3.4 percent of China’s direct FDI went to the region (and much of China’s FDI goes unreported).

Political ties between China and Africa are nearly as advanced. Since 2000, China and Africa have held the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) every three years. There is no regular forum even remotely similar between the United States and Africa, and this month’s one-time summit cannot replace an established forum. Nor is senior-level engagement between Beijing and Africa limited to the FOCAC. In the same month that Xi Jinping assumed the Chinese presidency, he visited three African nations as part of his first visit abroad. With the exception of a brief stop off in Ghana, President Obama didn’t even visit the continent until halfway through his second term. Similarly, while Vice President Joe Biden has yet to visit Africa while in office, Chinese premier Li Keqiang visited Nigeria, Angola and Kenya just over a year after taking up his current office. As a nice touch, Premier Li made his week long Africa visit the first official trip he took with his wife.

China’s Growing Interests

Another reason that the United States can’t beat China in Africa is because Beijing has expanding interests in the region. Specifically, China sees Africa as essential to securing its growing appetite for natural resources, and also hopes to increase its exports of finished goods to the region. Most notably among these, Africa is crucial to Beijing’s efforts to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil. In recent years, China has relied on Africa for as much as one-third of its imported oil. If China’s economy keeps growing at a reasonable rate, the amount of oil that Beijing imports from Africa will continue expanding.

All signs suggest that Chinese leaders are busy preparing for this future. During his trip earlier this year, Premier Li promised to double bilateral trade with Africa to $400 billion by 2020. Li also said China planned to quadruple its direct investment in Africa to $100 billion during the same time (and again, much of China’s FDI in Africa goes unreported). Given that the United States already lags far behind China in many of these indicators, it will have to accelerate its engagement at an even faster rate. For example, U.S. trade with Africa would have to more than quadruple over the next six years.

America’s Declining Interests

America has a declining interest in Africa////

. Despite chiding China for being only interested in Africa for its oil and natural resources, America’s interests in the region are largely the same. According to the Congressional Research Service, around 60 percent of U.S. imports from Africa are in oil. Other estimates suggest that more than 75 percent of U.S. imports from the region are made up of natural resources.

This is problematic for future U.S.-African trade given that the United States has a sharply declining need for African oil. Indeed, in the last four years alone, the United States has reduced its oil imports from Africa by an astonishing 90 percent. As the energy revolution in the Western Hemisphere continues, the United States is likely to stop importing oil from Africa altogether.

Even with the growing economic opportunities in the Sub-Saharan, this fact alone suggests that U.S.-African trade is likely to decline in the coming years. That indeed has been the trend of the last few years. As noted above, last year, America’s bilateral trade with Africa was $85 billion. That was down substantially from $125 billion in 2011. Trade with Africa is on course to further decrease this year, with the first five months of 2014 producing just $31 billion in trade. In other words, America’s chances of quadrupling trade with Africa by 2020 hover just around none.

Unfair Competition

The fourth reason that the United States can’t beat China in Africa is that the game is rigged. That is, Chinese businesses possess a number of distinct advantages over their American counterparts in the African marketplace.

Most important among these is the strong support they receive from the Chinese government. Because of the strategic nature of China’s economic interests in Africa, Beijing is willing to provide substantial backing to the (largely state-owned) Chinese businesses operating in Africa. As a result, these companies can often pay above market prices for African goods, something American businesses don’t have the luxury to afford. Similarly, Chinese businesses are often willing to invest in high-risk ventures, as well as operate in far more risky environments than their Western counterparts.

Along with the prestige projects the Chinese government is willing to fund, Chinese companies in Africa are also able to offer the bribes that are usually crucial to securing large contracts in the region. By contrast, American companies are prohibited from engaging in these practices by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Finally, because of their country’s own recent development, Chinese businesses (and bureaucrats) are usually more cognizant of Africa’s economic needs than are American ones.

Occupied Elsewhere

Stronger political engagement from the United States would not be enough to overcome these inherent economic disadvantages. Nonetheless, any increased engagement with Africa is likely to be limited—if it happens at all. For one thing, U.S. foreign policy suffers from an acute case of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and America’s transient interest in Africa (for example, one of highly publicized leadership summits) has been one of the prime symptoms of this.

There’s no reason to expect this to change in the coming years. Indeed, American diplomatic bandwidth is more than tied up elsewhere in the world. To begin with, the United States remains obsessed with the Middle East and terrorism. As its most recent intervention in Iraq demonstrates, no matter how hard a U.S. president tries to get the country out of the Middle East, the region pulls America back in. Given the amount of instability the region is likely to encounter in the years and decades ahead, there’s little chance America’s obsession will come to pass.

Nor is the Middle East alone in hogging U.S. attention. Russia’s recent misadventures in Ukraine have sparked a renewed interest in Washington in a pivot to Europe. In fact, senior defense leaders—including Gen. Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and chief of the U.S. European Command—are already indicating they’ll send more troops to the European theatre in the coming years.

If Secretary John Kerry’s public schedule is any guide, the amount of diplomatic attention Europe receives is also set to increase. It will also far outpace the attention Africa receives. Last year, the extent of Kerry’s time in Africa was limited to a day and a half in Ethiopia. Even that was a quick detour on a trip that was largely spent in the Middle East and Europe. So far this year, Kerry has spent a week in Africa visiting five different nations, and made quick stop offs in Morocco and Algeria on the tail end of a Europe trip, and Tunisia at the tail end of an Asia-Middle East trip. By contrast, this year alone, Kerry has made fourteen trips to Europe, visiting eleven different countries and the Holy See. Indeed, he has visited France six times alone, spending far more time in Paris than in all of Africa.

Besides the Middle East and Europe, any remaining energy and resources the United States can devote to far-sighted planning will go to the Asia-Pacific. In other words, the United States will be severely constrained in the amount of attention it can expend on Africa. This small amount is likely to be wholly consumed with counterterrorism and humanitarian interventions. Exploiting Africa’s burgeoning economic opportunities will continue to take a backseat.

In sum, the U.S.-Africa Leaders summit notwithstanding, the United States cannot compete with China in Africa. Fortunately, it doesn’t have to. The Sino-American rivalry will not be decided in Africa, and the region is one place where the two countries’ interests are not zero-sum. Instead of competing with China in Africa, the United States should seek to exploit as many opportunities as it can, while asking Beijing to do the heavy lifting in the region commensurate with its greater interests and influence.

### 2AC N/UQ—China SoI High

#### China is already expanding access in Djibouti

Miles and Blankenship, 1/3/15 – Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University studying international relations and former program analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University studying international relations (Renanah and Brian, “Djibouti’s First, But Will it Last?” https://www.lawfareblog.com/djiboutis-first-will-it-last)

In November, China announced plans to open its first overseas military outpost in Djibouti, the tiny African state strategically situated on the Horn of Africa. Citing the need for a logistics hub to resupply Chinese Navy ships for anti-piracy missions, Chinese officials have avoided the term “base,” although this is how U.S. officials have characterized it. This move provides Djibouti with outside options and brings new competition to the market for access in the Horn of Africa. The competition, however, is not just between governments: it also includes directed commercial spending tied to military access.

Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier is the only official U.S. base in Africa, housing around 4,000 U.S. personnel. After signing a 20-year lease deal in 2014, it also became the most expensive overseas U.S. base with annual rents of $63 million. Djibouti’s geostrategic location and relative stability provide an ideal toehold on the edge of two continents for major powers looking to conduct counterterrorism missions, combat piracy, and protect shipping routes. This gives Djibouti the upper hand in (re)negotiating terms as new consumers bargain for access.

Base rents are a major cash flow for Djibouti, but they aren’t the only resources pouring in. Both the United States and China are pursuing broader economic strategies that use commercial and developmental incentives to win influence and buy access. Djibouti, with a gross domestic product of just under $1.6 billion in 2014, receives large foreign aid donations. Between 2010 and 2013, Djibouti received official development assistance (ODA) amounting to 10.1 percent of its GDP—$10 million from Beijing, more than $45 million from Washington, and more than $522 million from other donors reported by the OECD.

Yet, this highly conservative estimate doesn’t include non-concessional forms of aid such as other official flows (OOF) that target commercial objectives. Most of China’s aid to Africa is non-concessional, commercially oriented aid that creates opportunities for Chinese and African companies. Even though U.S. ODA dwarfs China’s, adding each country’s OOF and other state flows creates a total level of Chinese aid that rivals America’s across the continent. In Djibouti, for example, looking at all reported official aid (including ODA and OOF) between 2010 and 2013 adds nothing to the U.S. figure, while Chinese aid increases by a whopping $134 million.

### 2AC No Link—Not Zero Sum

#### No trade off—the U.S. and China aren’t competing for influence or access in Africa—have a high threshold for link specificity

Larry HANAUER, senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, former senior staff member of the U.S. House of Representatives' Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), M.A.L.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, AND Lyle MORRIS, project associate at the RAND Corporation, M.A. in international affairs from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), 14 [*Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, 2014, p. 89-90, Accessed Online through MSU Libraries]

The United States and China actually have similar strategic interests in Africa. China, as discussed in the Chapter Two, has four overarching strategic interests in Africa: access to natural resources, particularly oil and gas; export markets; political support, particularly in international fora and adherence to its “One China” policy; and sufficient security and stability to ensure the safety of its investments and the continuation of its commercial activities.

With the exception of the “One China” policy, the United States shares these interests; it seeks access to natural resources, export markets for U.S. products, and support for policy initiatives at the United Nations and other international arenas. It also has an interest in promoting security and stability on the continent, although U.S. security concerns extend to a wider range of issues, such as the mitigation of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and international crime. The United States also seeks access for U.S. military forces, including ground troops and both air and naval assets, to both train African counterparts and directly engage threats to U.S. national security— a strategic military interest that goes far beyond the military diplomacy in which China engages as a means of fostering overall diplomatic ties.1

However, for the most part, the United States and China have pursued different policy objectives and priorities in Africa in virtually every arena— political, military, economic development, economic and commercial engagement, and cultural outreach. The United States has emphasized good governance, foreign aid focused on human development, and private sector– led investment, whereas China has stressed political independence and state-backed investment in infrastructure and natural resource extraction. 2 As Senator Richard Lugar, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated, “They are investing in infrastructure and building potential for economic growth. We are investing in people and health care.” 3 AFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham stated more bluntly in November 2012, “We don’t focus much on building stuff. We’ve chosen a different path, which is primarily investment in human capital.” ” 4 With China’s recent decision to increase its people-to-people engagement, however, Beijing, too, will increasingly be investing in Africa’s human capital.

As a result of these very different approaches to advancing their interests, Washington and Beijing are not competing directly against each other for strategic access or influence in Africa; unlike the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold war, when relations with individual African countries were more or less a zero-sum game, Washington and Beijing are each unilaterally pursuing their own goals and priorities in Africa, and competition exists in those areas where specific policy or commercial objectives differ.

To the extent that Chinese activities conflict with U.S. policy goals, Washington is likely to do little to address the discrepancy, as it has far more strategically important interests to advance in its bilateral relations with Beijing. Furthermore, though many observers have looked for areas in which Washington and Beijing can collaborate in Africa, the absence of significant overlap in U.S. and Chinese policy objectives means that few opportunities exist for the two countries to partner in pursuit of shared regional interests. While shared strategic interests might prompt discussions among bureaucrats from both governments on how the two countries might cooperate, such consultations rarely create government-led initiatives in which both sides devote resources and manpower to achieve policy deliverables.

### AT: China DA—Neolib K

#### The DA views Africa as a space to compete over resources with China. This framing of Africa justifies neoliberal exploitation, which runs roughshod over the environment.

-Roots of neoliberalism in U.S. imperial expansion—specifically connected to Africom

-K of China DA—they see Africa as a space to compete over resources for zero sum economic growth

-Prioritization of economic efficiency has resulted in tremendous environmental harm

Horace CAMPBELL, Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, AND Amber MURREY, PhD student in the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford, 14 [“Culture-centric pre-emptive counterinsurgency and US Africa Command: assessing the role of the US social sciences in US military engagements in Africa,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 35, Issue 8, 2014, p. 1457-1475, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

Militarisation and the political economy of empire

The militarisation of the US social sciences in Africa is conducted in the context of both the history of social science involvement in imperial projects and the frameworks of liberalisation and privatisation, which serve to legitimatise external control over African economies. The post-World War II development of the US imperial state was dependent upon its self-appointed unique capacity to act as a global policing power. The urgency of this policing mechanism was informed by the need to maintain its currency hegemony over the reserves of all the other countries in the world.26

At the end of the World War II factions within the USA propagated a triumphant liberalism to shore up the ideology of capitalism internationally. Subsequent to the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 (as the country embarked on an adoption of what Barry Eichengreen terms its ‘Exorbitant Privilege’ by maintaining an international reserve currency without the requisite economic foundations),27 a new ideological offensive was launched under the banner of neoliberalism. Through a process of political engineering the revolving door between Wall Street, the US Treasury and the imf ensured that US policy makers grasped the centrality of the role of the dollar in international politics. In the speculative orgy inspired by the process of arbitrage and bubble-blowing, specialised financial operators brought together, in the words of Peter Gowan, ‘the maximum amount of information about conditions across all markets; [this type of speculative finance] also demands the capacity to mobilize huge funds to throw into any particular arbitrage play, in order to shift market dynamics in the speculator’s favour.’28 Indeed, documents leaked by Edward Snowden reveal the scope of operations engaged in by the US National Security Agency (nsa) to bring together the ‘maximum amount of information about conditions across all markets’.29

Samir Amin characterises this intellectual and ideological emphasis as a ‘Liberal Virus’ characterised by ‘Permanent War and the Americanization of the World’.30 He argues that the military management of the international system requires permanent wars and instability.31 The foundational assertion of US liberalism (and its newer face, neoliberalism) is that social effectiveness and well-being are equal to economic efficiency. Economic efficiency, according to liberal theory, is dependent on the profitability of capital. By interpreting and defining ‘progress’ in purely economic terms, economics comes to determine and, Amin argues, govern the political. In this way of thinking a democracy operates to the exclusive service of the economy and of capital.

Never mind that the implementation of neoliberal policies requires the noted absence of democratic participation, especially among working people as labour rights are systematically repressed. Unregulated markets in African countries have permitted and sustained authoritarian political environments in which workers do not have the right to organise. Privatisation and the centralisation of power has resulted in massive environmental destruction by oil companies, unregulated plunder of forest resources, the decline of subsistence positions, rising inflation and high unemployment. The well-being, livelihoods and even the lives of people become expenditures on the pathway to social progress and structural transformation. Predatory economic practices in African countries are shrouded in the discourse of development, modernisation and free trade, which advocate the continuation of international economic exploitation in the name of market deregulation.32 The implementation of neoliberal policies since the 1980s has led to an increase in social inequalities and a resulting increase in the coercive nature of American imperial practices.33 This is reflected in the increase in securitisation and militarisation in US foreign policy since the 1990s.34

US military operations are informed by a political–economic framework that promotes the propagation and protection of finance capital at the dictates of US imperial interests. Imperialist designs, articulated through foreign policy and military engagement, ‘are always dynamic and ever changing’ but what remains constant is their ‘sole objective of making the world safe for capital’.35 Global capital accumulation requires that foreign markets remain open to the interests of capital and that national governments enable foreign capital investment.36 At the top of former Commander Carter Ham’s list of the roles of US Africom is ‘protecting the security of the global economic system’.37 Similarly, the US Defense Strategic Guidance for 2012 states: ‘We seek the security of our Nation, allies and partners. We seek the prosperity that flows from an open and free international economic system’.38 In this paradigm US ‘national security’ is often conflated with the push for continued US economic dominance abroad, as has been the case in reasoning for the establishment of Africom: economic competition, primarily with China. In a period that has witnessed the intensified - though uneven and complex – penetration of African countries by India, China, Brazil, Turkey, Japan and the EU, US military engagement in Africa is legitimated by conceptualisations within the USA of Africa as a space for foreign capital, exploitation and investment.39